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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff-Respondent, {

VERNON

Case No. 10187

HO;~RD

CANNON, (
De/endant ..Appellant. '

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal by the Defendant and Appellant,
Vernon Howard Cannon, hereinafter referred to as the
defenant, from a jury verdict finding the defendant guilty
of automobile homicide.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case came on regularly for hearing on Tuesday,
March 10, 1964, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. The above
matter was heard before the Honorable Merrill C. Faux,
one of the Judges of the above named Court sitting with a
jury. After the jury had been impannelled and evidence
submitted on behalf of the State, witnesses were called and
1
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testified on behalf of the defendant, Vernon Howard Can..
non. At the conclusion of the case, the Court instructed
and submitted the case to the jury. On the 12th day of
March, 1964, the jury returned a verdict finding the de..
fendant guilty of the offense of automobile homicide as
charged in the information.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant, Vernon Howard Cannon, seeks a new
trial because of the fact that the Judge during the trial held
March 10 through March 12, 1964, committed error prej-udicial to the defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant, Vernon Howard Cannon, was charged
on the 24th day of October, 1963, before J. Patten Neeley,
Judge of the City Court in and for Salt Lake City, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, with the crime of "Automo-bile Homicide" in violation of Title 76 Chapter 30, Section
7.4 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as follows"
"That the said Vernon Howard Cannon at the time and
place aforesaid, he being then and there a person driving
and operating a vehicle on a public highway while being
then and there under the influence of intoxicating liquor
did then and there drive said vehicle negligently, carelessly
and recklessly so as to cause the death of another, to-wit:
Franklin Lester Hewlett and Fleming Christensen." (R--6)

The defendant appeared on October 30, 1963, and after
being arraigned, asked the Court to appoint a day for a
preliminary hearing. Preliminary Hearing was held Febru-ary 30, 1964, at which time the State presented its case,
after which defendant was advised of his right to make a
statement not under oath. The defendant chose not to take
2
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the stand, and the Court ruling that there was probable
cause, bound the defendant over to the District Court to
stand trial on the charge of automobile homicide.
On February 17, 1964, the defendant appeared before
the Honorable Merrill C. Faux, Judge of the Third District
Court, and entered a plea of not guilty to the information
filed by Jay E. Banks, District Attorney for the Third Judi-cial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Trial was set for March 10, 1964, at 10:00 a.m.
On March 10, 1964, the case of the State of Utah vs.
Vernon Howard Cannon came on regularly for hearing.
After the jury had been called and sworn, the District At-torney made a motion to amend the information as origi-nally filed by striking therefrom the words "Franklin Lester
Hewlett, and,"; to this the defendant objected. (R--57)
After the Court reconvened, the State called as its first
witness a Mr. Jack Retallick, who after being sworn, iden-tified himself as a Deputy Sheriff of Salt Lake County. On
August 21, 1963 (October 21, 1963), he investigated an
accident that had occurred on Wasatch Boulevard just
South of the Parley's Canyon Interchange. (R--64) He
received the call at 10:15 p.m. when he was in the area of
12th East and 39th South Streets (R--65), and arrived at
the scene of the accident at 10:21 p.m. (R--66). When he
arrived at the scene of the accident, he observed a Chev-rolet automobile and a Morris Miner station wagon, a
small foreign car, that had been involved in an accident
(R. .66). At the time he arrived at the accident scene, the
roads were dry and the weather was clear (R.-66). The
Chevrolet was facing a "northward direction," and the
Morris Miner station wagon was facing "southward"
lying on its side (R--66). The highway upon which the ac . .
3
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cident occurred has four lanes, two for south bound traffic
and two for north bound traffic. The north and south lanes
are divided by two wide yellow lines. (R--68) Soon after
arriving at the scene of the accident, the officer checked
two individuals involved in the accident. Both had been
passengers in the Morris Miner station wagon. One of
them, identified by the officer as the Christensen boy, was
lying on the side of the station wagon and at the time the
officer examine this particular individual, he appeared to
be dead (R--74).
When the officer checked the Chevrolet he observed
Mr. Cannon seated almost in the driver's seat with a
bandage around his head (R--75).
In the area where the accident occurred, there was a
deep gouge just south of the wreckage that indicated the
point of impact (R--75), and there were some skid marks
coming in toward the gouge mark that were left by the
left rear wheel of the Chevrolet ( R--76) . The tire marks
crossed the double yellow line (R--76). The tire marks
moved from the south bound traffic lane into the north
bound traffic lane, the tire marks being at a 45 degree angle
to the highway (R--77). The gouge mark was approxi-mately two and one--half feet east of the edge of the double
yellow line (R--78). The major damage on the Chevrolet
automobile was to the right front (R--85), while the
damage to the Morris Miner station wagon was along the
front of the vehicle (R--86). In spite of the rather marked
difference in the size of the two vehicles involved in the ac-cident, the smaller car, the Morris Miner station wagon,
knocked the Chevrolet 26 feet north from the point ·of
impact (R--90). It was the officers opinion that the brake
marks would indicate all four wheels of the Chevrolet

4
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automobile were locked at the time it crossed over the
double yellow lines (R.-91).
Officer Retallick, while making his investigation at the
scene of the accident, did not talk to the defendant (R--91).
George W. Golightly, one of the three eye--witnesses to
the accident, was proceeding north on Wasatch Boulevard
when he first noticed the Morris Miner station wagon pull
up to a stop at his right at the intersection of Wasatch
Boulevard and 33rd South Streets (R--97). After the light
changed, the cars proceeded north and prior to reaching
the point of impact the Morris Miner had pulled ahead
and into his lane of traffic (R--98).
As Golightly proceeded North he observed two head-lights from a car coming from the opposite direction cross
the center lane into the north bound lanes of traffic where
the impact occurred (R.-98). After the accident occurred,
Mr. Golightly pulled around to the right hand side of the
accident and turned his car so that the lights of his car
were directed at the accident (R.-99). Golightly first looked
into the defendant's car and observed the defendant on the
floor of the car on the right hand side up under the dash-board (R--1 00). He helped the defendant back up onto the
seat of the car at which time he thought he detected the
odor of alcohol (R.-1 01). At the time Golightly first ob-served the defendant in his automobile, the defendant ap-peared to be in shock (R--1 05).
Robert Bennion, another eye--witness to the accident,
was proceeding south on Wasatch Boulevard shortly after
10:00 o'clock, he observed an automobile which was
stopped or very nearly stopped at the bottom of the hill
just south of the Parley's Canyon Interchange (R--112). As
5
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he approached the stopped automobile, it started up, made
a directional change from a westerly to a southerly direc-tion, and approached the rear of a large grain truck going
very slowly up the hill (R..-113). The Chevrolet veared sud-denly to the left across the south bound inside lane into
the north bound inside traffic lane at which time the ac-cident occurred (R..-114). Mr. Bennion testified that the
accident occurred shortly after 10:00 o'clock p.m. (R--115).
After the accident the defendant was transported to the
Salt Lake County Hospital where Dr. Burton Janis, an
intern at the Hospital, obtained a blood sample (R..-121).
After extracting the blood sample from the arm of the
defendant, it was placed in a vial provided by. the officer
(R..-121). State's Exhibit 3 was identified by the doctor as
the vial in which the defendant's blood was placed (R-122). The vial handed to the doctor by the officer, as far as
the doc to~ can remember, was free of any visible material
(R..-123). The blood sample was obtained at 11:54 p.m.
approximately· one hour and forty..-five minutes after the
accident had occurred (R..-125). Deputy Rosendaal talked
to the defendant at the Hospital and received permission
from him to extract blood (R..-129).
At the hospital Deputy Rosendaal asked the defendant
if he had had anything to drink, at which time he answered
yes, that he had had a couple of drinks of whiskey (R..-134).
When asked what had happened just prior to the accident,
the defendant answered, "I don't know. I either fell asleep
or passed out." (R..-135).
H. Kent Francis, a chemist employed by the State of
Utah, received Exhibit 3, the vial in which the blood had
been placed at the time it was extracted from the defendant,
6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

on October 22, 1963, at 10:53 a.m. (R . . 147). Mr. Francis
examined the blood to determine the per cent of alcohol by
weight in the blood and according to his examination, it
contained .193% of alcohol by weight (R. . 148).
Dr. Stewart C. Harvey testified extensively as to the
effect of alcohol upon the human body (R. . 161 through
R. . 172). The State then rested.
The defendant in Chambers made a motion to dismiss
because of the State's failure to prove a case (R. . 183), and
the Court stated, "There are a number of elements in the
evidence which indicate to the Court that the jury might
find intoxication- under the influence of alcohol - at
the time of the accident; and the motion for dismissal is
denied." (R. . 183)
The defendant then called witnesses and presented evi . .
dence which showed that on the day of the accident the de . .
fendant arrived at his sister's home where he resides at
approximately 5:30 p.m. He changed his clothes and
promptly left for the Parley's Canyon Cafe. Defendant at
that time did not stop to eat and according to his sister
had had nothing to drink at that time (R . . 193). The
defendant arrived at the Parley's Canyon Cafe at approxi . .
mately 6:00p.m. (R . . 195). Soon after arriving at the Cafe,
the defendant sat down with Robert E. Lee, his business
partner, and Mr. Lee's wife in the Cafe. The defendant was
seated between Mr. Lee and his wife and at the time the
defendant gave no indication of having had anything to
drink (R . . 196, R. .219). At approximately 6:30p.m. the de . .
fendant in the company of Mr. Lee left the Cafe and drove
in Mr. Lee's car to Keetley, Utah (R . . 196). Upon arriving
at Keetley, the defendant waited in the car while Mr. Lee
went into a home to talk to an individual. When Mr. Lee

7
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returned to the car, there was no evidence indicating that
the defendant had had anything to drink during that ten
minute period (R..-197). On the way back to the Parley's
Canyon Cafe, Mr. Lee and the defendant drove from
Keetley to the junction at Park City. From there the two
proceeded on down Parley's Canyon where they stopped
at a small Cafe called "Fort Ute" and had a cup of coffee.
After leaving the Cafe, the two drove down to the
Parley's Canyon Cafe, arriving at approximately 8:10 in
the evening (R..-200). Upon returning to the Cafe, Mr. Lee
invited the defendant to his trailer to have dinner with
himself and his wife (R..-200). Mr. Lee and his wife sat
down with the defendant to dinner, in the trailer that is
their home, at approximately 8:20 p.m. and at that time
neither Mr. Lee nor his wife noticed any evidence of liquor
on or about the defendant (R..-202, R..-221, R..-222). After
dinner was completed, the defendant was invited by the
Lees to stay with them and watch a TV show (R..-203).
While the Lees and the defendant were together the only
beverage consumed by any of them was coffee (R..-204). Just
before 10:00 p.m. the defendant in the company of Mr. Lee,
left the trailer and went over to the Cafe where the de. .
fendant drank another cup of coffee (R..-215). The de. .
fendant had had no intoxicating beverage to drink until
after he had left the trailer home of the Lee's (R--232).
The defendant got into his car to leave. As he stopped
preparitory to entering the highway, a pint of whiskey
which was half full (R..-235) and which had been left
under the front seat, slid forward (R--223). While waiting
for traffic to clear, the defendant took a "good jolt"
(R..-233). Approximately three miles down the Canyon, the
defendant pulled off to the side of the road where he took
another drink and smoked a cigarette (R--234). After
8
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finishing the cigarette, the defendant proceeded on down
the Canyon and stopped at the red light at the Parley's
Canyon Interchange (R. . 234).
The defendant remembers nothing after stopping for
the red light at the Parley's Canyon Interchange (R. . 234)
and his memory is a blank until he regained consciousness
at the County Hospital (R. . 234).
As a result of the accident, defendant received a con. .
cussion, a badly lacerated ear and the loss of several of his
upper teeth. The defendant, after regaining consciousness
at the County Hospital, when asked by the investigating
officer what had happened, said he thought he had either
gone to sleep or run off the road (R. . 235).
In March of -1962, the defendant was stricken with an
infection of the inner ear known as "Meniere's Disease"
(R--227). The first indication of the illness occurred one
morning when the defendant in attempting to arise from
his bed was unable to do so, and in fact, when he did gain
his feet, he fell down several times (R--249). The symptoms
he experienced were extreme dizzyness, inability to stand
upon his feet, and a terrible nausea. For this particular ill-ness he was treated by Dr. Gordon R. Evans (R--228). The
defendant was a patient of Dr. Evans for approximately
three months.
After the first attack, the disease was kept reasonably
in check through the use of medications prescribed by the
doctor (R--229). However, the defendant has experienced
a very mild reoccurrence of some of the symptoms, but
upon taking the medicine prescribed by the doctor, he
has not experienced the violent symptoms as they origin-ally occurred (R--229). The acute manner in which the
9
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disease affected the defendant made it impossible to
walk without falling (R~250). Meniere's Disease is a reoc-curring type illness R~249). The symptoms may not re-occur for days, weeks, months or even years (R--249).
There is no particular reason why the symptoms return in
such a sporatic manner (R~249). Dr. Evans treated the de-fendant for Meniere's Disease during March, April and
into May of 1962. He was also examined in October of
1962.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE STATE'S
MOTION TO STRIKE FROM THE RECORD ALL THE EVI..
DENCE OFFERED BY THE DEFENDANT CONCERNING
MENIEREJS DISEASE BECAUSE (1) THE MOTION WAS
UNTIMELY, AND (2) THE STATE INTRODUCED SOME
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE DISEASE.

At the conclusion of the defendant's case the trial court
inquired of Mr. Banks, District Attorney, if the State had
any rebuttal evidence. To this Mr. Banks replied in the
negative (R~296). After a lengthy discussion between
Court and counsel in chambers concerning the proposed
instructions to be given to the jury (R~296 through R--302)
the District Attorney made the following Motion: "MR.
BANKS: Before he makes that Motion, I would like to
make a Motion to Reopen." "MR. BARKER: For what?"
"MR. BANKS: For the purpose of making a Motion. I
rested on rebuttal, but I would like to move the Court to
reopen at this time." "THE COURT: The Motion is
granted." (R--302) "MR. BANKS: At this time, the State
would move to strike all the evidence concerning - can't
remember the name- Meniere's Disease, on the grounds
10
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that there is p.o evidence that he was suffering from that at
the time of this accident, and the only evidence that did
come in related back toMarch, through May of 1962, and,
by allowing the jury to consider that, it would be confusing
and misleading." (R--303) The defendant objected to the
Motion.
The Court granted the Motion and in Instruction No.
18, stated as follows:
"You are instructed that all evidence which has been
admitted in this case relating to or concerning what the
doctors have called 'Meniere's Disease' is struck from the
record, and you are to pay no attention or give any con-sideration to that evidence.'' (R--25)
1. During the course of the trial Dr. John Waldo was
called by the defendant as a witness. During a brief exam. .
ination of Dr. Waldo, cefense counsel asked several ques . .
tions concerning Meniere's Disease. At this time the Dis. .
trict Attorney objected. The basis of his objection was that
no proper foundation had been laid (R. . 24 7). After the
objection and a short conference at the bench, Dr. Waldo
was excused and Dr. Gordon R. Evans was called on behalf
of the defendant.
Dr. Evans testified extensively concerning an affliction
the defendant was suffering from and identified it as
Meniere's Disease. The objection above referred to is the
only one that the State raised concerning testimony about
Meniere's Disease during the full course of the trial.
It is axiomatic that an objection to the admissibility of
evidence must be made at the time the evidence is offered
and it is incumbent upon the party raising the objection to
state the grounds therefor. In the case of Scott v. United
States, 317 F.2d 908, on appeal, the appellant claimed that
11
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the trial court erred when it allowed the government to
place in evidence a pack of cigarettes which appellant had
dropped at the time of his arrest which contained five gela..
tin capsules of heroin. The court citing Fuller v. United
States, 53 App.. D.C. 88, 288 F. 442, stated: "The general
and obviously salutory rule is that objection to admissibility
of evidence should be made at the time it is offered and the
grounds therefor stated."
It is obvious that the State's Motion made at the time it
was made was nothing more than an afterthought (R.-302 ..
303). It being granted tended, certainly, to influence the
jury adversely in so far as the defendant's case was con.cerned. It deleted all of the evidence concerning the defense
the defendant presented to the jury and it is the contention
of defendant that the Motion was untimely and since the
evidence went in without objection, it should have been
submitted to the jury on that basis.
In the case of Lambert, et al. v. United States, 26 F.2d
773, 9th Circuit, a witness was called by the Government
and testified about the general reputation of Lambert's
business as a place where intoxicating liquor could be pur.chased. The witness was then asked, "Go ahead and tell
what you know." His answer was lengthy and included
facts concerning bootleggers who had been convicted un.der a different indictment. The defendant then made a
motion to strike. This motion was overruled. The defendant
on appeal assigned as error the court's ruling. The Circuit
Court stated: "However, the answer was in a measure
responsive to the question, and the question was not ob ..
jected to. A party will not be permitted to speculate as to
that the testimony will be, and then move to strike the
answer if not to his liking." (emphasis added)
12
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That the State was speculating as to the testimony of
the doctors examined and cross..-examined is obvious.
In order that the full picture be developed and all ne..cessary relevant evidence be given the jury, considerable
latitude in examination of witnesses is ordinarily allowed
in our trial courts, and counsel must accept the hazard of
uncovering evidence which although relevant is unfavor..able to his particular position. United States v. Barbone,
283 F.2d 628; State v. Thompson, 117 NW2nd 514; State
v. Pavers, 375 P.2d 260; Isaac v. United States, 301 F.2d

706.
2. The State in effect -pre~ented some of the strongest
evidence when under cross..-examination the District Attor..ney asked Dr. Bernson the question: "Doctor, can you tell
us what is 'Meniere's Disease'?" (R..-285) The Direct Exam..ination of Dr. Bernson included absolutely nothing con..cerning Meniere's Disease. In response to the question
2sked by the District Attorney, Dr. Bernson stated as fol..lows: "Meniere's Disease is a chronic, reoccuring disease
involving eight nerves - nerves of hearing, and also the
nerves of balance. They, for instance, were connected by
the same nerve; as a result of this regenerative process, a
patient- especially in periods of vertigo, commonly
known as dizzyness, associated with nausea, vomiting dis..turbance, or other forms of the balance mechanism, which
would include the eye and nystagmus, eyes jerk from side
to side.''
"In extremely violent cases, they will be knocked to the
ground or to the floor just as if hit with a sledge hammer;
not losing consciousness, as a rule, but complete loss of
their power of coordination, motivation or locomotion."
(R--285)
13
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The State made Dr. Bernson its witness in so far as the
initial examination of the doctor about Meniere's Disease.
It is obvious that the District Attorney was speculating on
the answer and as above noted in the Lambert case. This
is not to be permitted.
In the case of Dare v. State, 378 P.2d 339 the plain-tiff in error, Dare, was charged with the murder of his
father . .in. .law. The State introduced three confessions all
of which were substantially the same. Dare contended
that the introduction of the third confession was merely
repetitious and cumulative and therefore prejudicial. The
Court held that the objection was without merit and cited
Foster v. State, 294 P. 268. The portion pertinent to this
case being: "We think, even though it was not shown,
that the confessions were not voluntarily made, they should
not on appeal be held erroneously admitted when no
objected was interposed until the principal facts in that
connection are told to the jury ... especially so in view of
the use made of such confessions to establish the de ..
fendant' s defense of insanity." (Emphasis added).
The motion made by the State after both sides had
rested may have been proper had it been made at the time
Dr. Evans concluded his testimony. However, from an
examination of the record, the matter broached by the
State in cross . . examining Dr. Bernson appears to be nothing
more than a fishing expedition, and upon catching a bull-head, now the State wants to thro\v it back into the turped
waters so that it will not foul the rest of is each.
In the case of State v. Green, 150 S.2nd 571 The
Court states "The substance of the answer to the ques-tion objected to had already been given by the witness
without his (the defendant's) objection in his answer to
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the previous question. It is well settled that objection to the
admissibility of testimony comes too late after testimony
has gone to the jury."
As previously noted in the Statement of Facts, the de~
fendant in March of 1962 was stricken with an infection
of the inner ear known as Meniere's Disease (R~227).
Meniere's Disease was identified and described by Dr.
Waldo as ". . . a chronic disease involving the balance
organ- the ninth nerve, which causes very severe dizzy~
ness, which is a chronic, reoccurrent disease." {R~246)
(Emphasis added). Dr. Waldo further testified by that
chronic, reoccurrent disease he meant, "disease that may
have- that may have its manisfestations - that is, in this
case, the dizzyness for a given period; then may stop com~
pletely, and may reoccur fater an interval of weeks or
months." R~247)
Dr. Evans testified that all facts taken into considera~
tion it would be difficult if not impossible to tell at the time
an examination was made of the defendant at the hospital
whether or not he had suffered an attach of Meniere's
Disease. (R~272) His answer took into consideration the
fact that the defendant had suffered a concussion and was
examined while prone upon a hospital bed. The testimony
of Doctors Evans, Waldo and Bernson concerning Meni~
ere's Disease was all the same. The questions had been
propounded while the jury was present and the answers
had been received.
The State in no way controverted the evidence offered
by the defendant that he had in fact suffered an attach of
Meniere's Disease and at the time of the accident was sub~
ject to this reoccuring malady. The evidence presented by
the defendant shows that he was rendered unconscious by
15
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the accident and he remembers nothing after stopping for
the red light at the Parley's Canyon Interchange (R~234 ).
At the time he was examined by Dr. Bernson at the
County Hospital he was unaware of what had transpired
and wasn't too clear as to exactly where he was or why
(R~280). On page 272 of the record Dr. Bernson testified
that it was his conclusion that the defendant had been
rendered unconscious and that it was not unusual for per. .
sons sustaining the type of injury that had occurred to the
defendant to suffer retrograde amnesia and identified the
amnesia as the type that blots from the individual's memory
the things that transpired just prior to the actual trauma
which rendered the person unconscious.
The defendant readily admitted consuming a quantity
of whiskey just eight or ten minutes prior to the accident.
The evidence, both that presented by the State and by the
defendant, was to the effect that if the alcohol had been
consumed within eight or ten minutes before the accident,
the defendant certainly would not have been under the
influence of intoxicating liquor to such a degree as to render
him incapable of operating his car in the manner that an
ordinary, prudent and cautious person in the full posses. .
sion of his faculties would have been able to operate a
similar car under like conditions, and the only logical ex. .
planation as to what happened and the unusual movements
of defendant's car· was that he had suffered an attach of
Meniere's Disease.
As previously noted, the State in this case introduced
part of the evidence concerning Meniere's Disease- and con . .
sequently the later objection and motion to strike the same
is improper and its· effect did deprive the defendant of any
defense to the charge of automobile homicide, thereby
16
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prejudicing his cause before the jury. People v. Mitchell 26
Cal Rptr. 89; State v. Holmwood, 128 SE 2nd 28.
1

In the case of Downey v. People, 215 P2d 892, the
State called the doctor who performed an autopsy upon
the body of the deceased and on Direct Examination
he testified that the death was due to strangulation. Ac..cused's counsel, on Cross..-Examination, asked what the
results of a microscopic examination of the deceased's
larynx disclosed. Based upon specimens which the doctor
did not prepare, and which were not adequately traced to
the body of the deceased, the doctor stated his opinion. The
Court held that the accused could not assign as error on ap..peal the evidence thus elicited on the grounds that it is
hearsay, because much of the damaging testimony was
brought out during Cross..-Examination.
In the case of Burroughs v. State, 158 P2nd 723, the
Court held that the defendant could not complain of im-proper questions asked by the County Attorney of the
Chief of Police, one of the State's witnesses, on rebuttal,
where no exception was reserved by the defendant and~
in addition, on cross examination, the defendant's attorney
went into the same field and brought out additional matters
far more damaging to the defendant than the answers of
the Chief of Police to the original question.
In the case of State v. Jensen, 296 P.2d 618, 209 Or.
239, cert. denied 77 S.Ct. 329, rehearing denied 77 S.Ct.
388, the defendant was charged with first degree murder.
A doctor called by the defendant made a voluntary state..ment on Direct Examination concerning a matter which
he knew nothing about except as disclosed by medical
records he produced. The Court held his statement should
not have been permitted to go into evidence but such error
17
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was not reversible error in view of the fact that the de..
fendant introduced it.
In the Utah case of State v. Meyers, 385 P.2d 609, 14
Ut2d 417, the defendant was charged with the crime of
rape. On appeal, the defendant assigned as error ( 1) he
was denied a public trial; and, (2) that the testimony of
the arresting police officer upon cross--examination pre-judiced the jury when the officer stated that he did not ask
the defendant whether or not he was guilty at the time of
arrest because he knew him, thus implying the defendant
had committed other crimes. The Court in commenting
upon the second point stated, "In as much as it was defen-dant's own attorney who asked questions which brought
forth the answers on cross--examination, he is in no position
to complain of them." See also: State v. Gransberry, 307
P.2d 766; Simmons V. State, 372 P.2nd 239; People v.
Ketchel, 381 P.2d 394; State v. Borrego, 195 P.2nd 622.
In all the cases above cited, it \Vas the several defen-dants that failed to object to the introduction of evidence.
It seems that the situation we are presently faced with is
unusual. This writer has been unable to find any case that
is similar to the one presently before the Court. However,
the general rule as noted by the cited cases would apply
equally to the prosecting authority as well as to the
prosecuted.
In the case of State v. Gooze, 277, 81 A.2nd 811,
the defendant was charged with negligent homicide in
that an individual had been killed as a result of an auto-mobile accident. The defendant had been hospitalized
for treatment of Meniere's Syndrome (Meniere's Dis-ease) which had subjected him to spells of dizzyness and
"blacking out." At the time of the accident, the defendant,
18
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Gooze, had not suffered from such an attack for over a
period of a year, but had been warned by his doctors about
the possibility of its reoccurrence.
The defendant was found guilty in the Lower Court
and appealed upon the grounds that the evidence presented
by the State did not show the type of negligence ncessary
to sustain the conviction. The Appellate Court however
refused to reverse the matter finding that the evidence
presented was sufficient.
It would seem only logical and reasonable in the light
of the above cited case that the evidence presented by the
defendant in this case should have been submitted to the
jury for their consideration if in fact a person could be
found guilty of a crime because of an attach of Meniere's
Disease. It certainly would provide a reasonable hypothesis
as to what caused the accident in that all the evidence
presented is to the effect that the defendant consumed the
only alcohol he took into his system that day eight to ten
minutes before the accident. All the medical evidence,
which was extensive, was to the effect that the defendant
having consumed the alcohol just prior to the accident,
would have had a blood count at the time of the accident
not above .02 or .03 (R--179, R--255, R--178, R--270).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE BLOOD
ALCOHOL TEST IN THAT (1) NO PROPER FOUNDA..
TION WAS LAID AS TO THE REASONABLE ACCURACY
OF Tl-IE TEST, AND (2) ITS RELATION TO THE TIME
THE ACCIDENT" OCCURRED WAS TOO REMOTE.

1. The instrument used by Dr. Burton Janis to obtain the
blood sample that was eventually submitted to the State
19
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chemist for analysis was a prepackaged syringe and needle.
The prepackaged syringes and needles are supplied by the
hospital and apparently purchased from a medical supply
house. They are kept in a drawer in the emergency room of
the Salt Lake County Hospital. It was from such a drawer
that the doctor obtained the particular instruments used
in obtaining the blood of the defendant R~ 121). According
to the doctor, as far as he was aware, these prepackaged
instruments have never been tested to see if they are free
from contamination. His only qualification being that they
were purported to be sterile (R~ 126). The word "sterile"
as defined by Dr. Janis means "no life," and in no way
implies that the instruments are free from chemical con~
tamination (R~ 124).
After extracting the blood sample from the arm of the
defendant, the blood was placed in a vial provided by the
officer (R~ 121). On the evening of the accident, Deputy
Jack Retallick obtained from a cabinet in the emergency
part of the County Hospital the vial in which the blood
vvas placed (R~ 135). He testified that he examined the vial
and there didn't appear to be anything in it (R~ 136). After
the blood was placed in the vial, a piece of tape was placed
over the top and Deputy Retallick kept it in his possession
until the next day (R~ 139).
Upon leaving the County Hospital the Deputy placed
the vial in his pocket and proceeded about his business
(R~140). The Deputy took the vial home with him and
placed it on a shelf in his refrigerator (R~ 140). The next
morning when Deputy Rosendaal picked up Deputy Retal..
lick at his home, he took the vial from the refrigerator and
then delivered it to the State chemist R~ 140).
20
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Deputy Retallick testified that he had nothing to do
with the locker at the County Hospital from which he ob~
rained the vial and that he knew nothing about the pre~
paration of said vial; and he knew of no medical or chemi~
cal tests that had been performed to determine whether
there were any impurities in it R~ 141).
In running the test to determine the alcohol content,
Mr. Francis, the assistant State chemist, placed in the vial
that contained the blood sample a "small amount of
sodium fluoride powder" (R~ 149). From the original
sample three cubic centimeters were then withdrawn and
placed in a 50 millimeter centrifuge tube (R~ 150). Fifteen
cubic centimeters of distilled water was then added to the
centrifuge tube along with three cubic centimeters of so~
dium tungstate solution and three cubic centimeters of two~
thirds normal sulphuric acid solution. From this mixture a
ten cubic centimeter quantity was withdrawn and placed in
a distillation flask (R~ 150). What alcohol was present in
the sample was then distilled and collected (R~ 150). This
minute quantity was then increased in volume to twenty . .
five cubic centimeters (R . . 150). To this solution was added
one cubic centimeter of potassium dichromate and also five
cubic centemeters of sulphuric acid (R . . 151).
Mr. Francis testified that the chemicals used are only
checked one against the other in that the dichromate
is checked against the alcohol (R . . 155). He ran no tests
to determine the purety of the sodium fluoride powder,
distilled water, sodium tungstate solution or sulphuric
acid solution.
Mr. Francis on Cross. . Examination testified that if both
the alcohol and the dichromate were not pure, then the
test would be valueless and he stated on page 157, "Then,
21
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I would be lost." On page 152 Mr. Francis stated that he
did not know the manufacturer or supplier of particular
chemicals used as re agents for the test, nor could he testify
as to their purety. On page 153 he testified that these re
agents had been prepared prior to the date defendant's
blood was analyzed, and that in fact, some of the solutions
had been prepared possibly three months before the date
the test was run. The only statement made by Mr. Francis
as to the quality of the chemicals used is on page 154 where-in he stated that he knew that the chemicals were of "re-agent grade." There was no evidence offered as to what
'' re..-agen t agrade'' means. He is not certain that the chemi-cals used were pure. His conclusion was based upon the
fact that the specifications given to the supplier call for
this particular grade of chemical. At no time were the
chemicals ever checked except against one another
(R..-157). Mr. Francis testified further that even though he
later rechecked the blood he was not in any position to
state whether the chemicals used in the second analysis run
October 31, 1963, were any more pure than those used in
the original test, and therefore, any result would be subject
to the same error that occurred during the running of the
first test R..-140).
In light of the testimony of Dr. Janis, Deputy Retallick
and Mr. Francis, it would appear that in no instance did
the State prove that the instruments used in extracting the
blood, and the vial in which the blood was placed were
free from contamination that would later effect the result
of the test. Nor did Mr. Francis in his testimony show that
there was any degree of assurance that the chemicals used
were of a grade that would guarantee a reasonably accurate
result. Based upon such evidence, it is obvious that the
jury could only speculate as to the accuracy of the test, and
22
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in admitting the test into evidence, the Court erred and the
error substantially prejudiced the defendant, because it was
the only evidence of intoxication with the exception of
Golightly's statement that he thought he smelled alcohol.
Dr. Janis testified that if the vial used was not clean it
would have an effect upon the blood alcohol determination
(R--124). The fact that the implements used by the doctor
in extracting the blood and the vial in which the blood was
placed were free from contamination is not shown in the
State's evidence in that the doctor who administered the
test answered that as far as he was aware the sterile or non-contaminated nature of the implements used was not some-thing he was personally aware of, and in fact, his opinion
was second--hand in that it was based upon the representa-tions of others (R--126). The only evidence presented by
the State that the defendant may have been intoxicated
at the time of the accident was the blood alcohol test, which
as above indicated, is subject to very serious doubt.
Officer Retallick testified that in making his investiga. .
tion at the scene of the accident he did not talk to the de-fendant (R.-91). George W. Golightly, one of the eye-witnesses, testified only that at the time he observed the
defendant on the floor of the car, he thought he detected
the odor of alcohol (R--101). There were no tests at the
scene of the accident. There is no testimony from anyone
that they observed the defendant either walk or stand. The
only examination made of the defendant was while he was
prone upon a hospital bed. The only evidence as to the
manner in which the defendant operated his car involved
only seconds just prior to the accident (R--113).
2. According to the State's witnesses, the accident oc-curred just shortly after 10:00 o'clock p.m. (R--115), and
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the blood sample was not obtained until 11:54 p.m.
(R. . 125). The only testimony before the jury was to the
effect that the only alcohol consumed by the defendant was
taken into his system within ten minutes before the ac-cident. In the case of Commonwealth vs. Harmman,
119 A.2nd 211, the Court stated as follows: "The Com-monwealth's expert, Dr. Muehlberger, testified that from
one. . half hour to an hour and a half is required for the
alcohol in one's stomach to find its way completely into
the blood stream. If defendant in fact did not drink prior
to 3:00 p.m., the Commonwealth's own witness has dem-onstrated that the alcohol in his system may not have been
fully effective until 4:30 p.m., about fifteen minutes before
intoximeter test was apparently given, but at least forty
minutes after he stopped driving. Under the circumstances
just set forth, the result of the test would not be indicative
of defendant's condition at the time he was arrested ....
We conclude that the introduction of the evidence of the
result of the intoximeter test, when evidence of the Com-monwealth's witness, Dr. Muehlberger, indicates that the
alcohol may not have completely entered the blood stream
at the time of the defendant's arrest, was improper. Since
the jury may have relied upon such evidence and may have
found the defendant 'guilty' solely or largely from that
evidence, we conclude that a new trial should be awarded."
The State's witness Dr. Stewart C. Harvey testified ex-tensively about the effect of alcohol upon the human body
(R . . 161 through R . . 172). However, on voir dire the doctor
did state that a blood alcohol test shows only the concen-tration of alcohol in the human system at the moment the
blood is withdrawn R . . 172). He testified further that the
alcohol concentration may be increasing or decreasing de.
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pending upon when the alcohol was ingested by the in..dividual from whom the blood was extracted (R--172, 173).
Dr. Harvey testified that an average person weighing
approximately 160 pounds would have to consume almost
seven ounces of 86 proof whiskey to bring his blood alcohol
level to .1 per cent (R..-17 5). On Cross..-Examination the
doctor stated that the rate which alcohol is absorbed into
the system depends upon whether or not the person who
has ingested the alcoholic beverage has recently eaten or
whether the beverage was taken upon an empty stomach
(R--176). He was then asked, "If you were to take a blood
test that was taken some hour and fifty--four minutes or
two hours, or something like that, in order to be able to tell
what the blood level was at the time of the accident, you
would have to know when the alcohol was actually con..sumed?" His answer on page 177 was that that was correct.
When further asked, "Now, suppose that the alcohol was
actually consu1ned only about eight or ten minutes before
the accident, would it be your opinion that the level of
alcohol in the blood at the time of the accident would be
less than .19?" He answered, "Sir, it would be; it would be,
at that short time before the accident; probably not more
than 15% or 20o/o of maximum; the first ten minutes, of
course, are quite rapid-" According to the doctor's testi..mony, fifteen per cent of the total involved in this case
would be approximately .03 (R--179). Dr. Harvey further
testified that when a chemical analysis is run upon a blood
sample if the re..-agents are not pure, or reasonably so, the
result would not be correct and even when tests of sample
solutions are run, if the alcohol and the dichromate are not
pure or reasonably so, then the results would be incorrect
(R--180).
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In this case as in Commonwealth v. Harmman (supra)
the State's expert witness testified that there would be a
material difference between the alcohol level of the blood
in the defendant at the time of the accident as compared to
the time when the blood 'vas taken an hour and fifty--four
minutes later. In an article titled "The Physiological Action
of Alcohol," AMA Journal, Vol. 167, No. 15 (August 9,
1958) Dr. Muehlberger, the expert referred to in the Penn-sylvania case made a very careful analysis of the rate of
absorption after alcohol is ingested. It was his conclusion
that the absorption rate depends upon the quantity of
alcohol ingested, its concentration in the drink, the na-ture and quality of the dilluting material already in the
stomach, and the duration of its sojourn in the stom-ach. The only definite figure he gives on the rate of ab-sorption is that about 90 per cent of the alcohol from
a single drink 'vhen taken on an empty stomach \vill
be absorbed by the end of the first hour. All of the ex-perts who testified during the course of the trial did
admit that there is a possibility of error. Every real
scientist in the field agrees that the chemical tests alone
should never be used as a basis for a conviction, but should
be used only as corroboration; and the great weight should
be given to the objective's symptoms. In the case presently
before the Court, the only evidence of intoxication is the
blood test. See Forrester, Chemical Tests For Alcohol In
Traffic La\V Enforcement, page 57.
In addition to other possibilities of error heretofore
discussed, one should never overlook the possibility that
the blood sample may have been contaminated before it
reached the laboratory and such contamination 1nay have
effected in the final result of the analysis. It is well known
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that alcohol is commonly used by doctors and nurses and
by the suppliers of medical implements as an anticeptic.
Quite frequently the defendant in a drunk driving case
will have been injured in an automobile collision, as oc..curred in this case, and taken to a hospital before a blood
specimen is taken. If his injury is serious, it is not unlikely
that he will be given an anticeptic either immediately upon
being placed in an ambulance or upon his arrival at the
hospital. There are numerous types of anticeptics. Some of
them are mildly diluted with alcohol. This is particularly
true of novocaine.
The defendant did sustain a serious injury. ·According
to the doctor he was rendered unconscious. He suffered a
serious laceration of his face and ear. If the ordinary pro..cedures were followed in this case, it would be logical to
presume that either in the ambulance or upon his admis..sion to the hospital some arrticeptic was applied and that
possibly some pain killer, such as novocaine, may have been
administered to him. In the case of Lynch v. Clark, 194
P.2d 416, the Court stated: "When the ultimate issue
is intoxication as in drunk driving cases·, it may be that
evidence of alcoholic content of the blood, properly se..cured and presented, may suffice to prove intoxication.
Be that as it 1nay, a blood test to determine intoxica-tion is more remote from conduct, and therefore from
contributory negligence, than the test based upon pre-ceptability because of the known fact that the same quan . .
tity of alcohol in blood does not produce in all persons the
same degree of perceptable divergence from the normal. In
view of this fact, we may wisely limit our decision in the
pending case to the narrow issue presented. We hold that
in the absence of other evidence tending to show con tribu . .
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tory negligence, evidence derived solely from a blood test
indicating intoxication . . . was insufficient to present a
jury question of contributory negligence. Thus the Court
erred in admitting into evidence the blood test in that no
proper foundation was laid to show that the test may be
reasonably accurate and the blood test was too remote from
the time the accident occurred."
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFEND..
ANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE CONCLUSION OF
THE STATE'S CASE IN CHIEF ~ECAUSE OF THE STATE'S
FAILURE TO PROVE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF
THE CRIME OF AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE; AND THERE..
FORE, THE VERDICT OF THE JURY WAS BASED SOLELY
UPON SUPPOSITION AND CONJECTURE.

The State in presenting its evidence relied upon three
points. The first being the result of the blood test; the
second being the automobile accident itself and the testi..
mony of Robert Bennion who was one of the eye. .witnesses
to the accident; and the third point was the testimony of
George W. Golightly who testified that immediately after
the accident he thought that he observed the odor of
alcohol on or about the defendant.
There was no evidence presented by the State about any
test given at the scene of the accident. The usual tests given
are a coordination test, i.e. tilting the head backward, clos-ing the eyes, touching the nose with the tips of the fore-finger; the walking tests, i.e. a heel to toe walk down a
straight line; and the balance tests, i.e. dropping a coin or
keys upon the ground and requiring defendant to pick them
up while standing upon one leg. There is no evidence that
at the time of the accident the defendant had any of the
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obvious signs of intoxication such as a flushed face, bleary
eyes, thick or slurred speech; nor was there any evidence
presented by the State that- the defendant's clothes were
disarranged or dirty as a result of drinking.
The Court instructed the jury in Instruction No. 13
that the mere fact that the defendant's breath smelled of
alcohol was not in and of itself sufficient to show that the
defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
However, the only evidence the State produced as to the
condition of the defendant at the time of the accident was
that there was an odor of alcohol on his person.
The Court instructed the jury _also in Instruction No. 9
that the mere fact that the accident had occurred is not to
be taken as proof in and of itself that the defendant at the
time of the accident was engaged in an unlawful act or acts;
and also instructed the jury that accidents may happen
without any violation of law or criminal negligence on the
part of anyone.
The State relied upon the testimony of the two eye-witr:tesses, Mr. Bennion and Mr. Golightly. Mr. Bennion
described the rather unusual movements of the defendant's
car just before the accident occurred. Mr. Golightly testificJ
that he observed the headlights of the defendant's car cress
over into the north bound lane of traffic just before the ac-cident occurred.
The defendant's evidence did show that he was suf-fering from Meniere's Disease, and that he was subject
to a reoccurrence of the violent symptoms he experienced
in March of 1962. According to the medical evidence
presented there was a very distinct probability that violent
symptoms of the disease might reoccur at any time. If in
fact these symptoms occurred on the night of the accident,
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it would certainly explain the unusual manuevering of the
defendant's car just prior to the time of the accident.
The jury, certainly, in rendering its verdict, had to re..
sort to conjecture or speculation in finding that first, the
defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor
in that the only testimony before the jury was to the effect
that the alcohol consumed -by the defendant had been in ..
gested eight to ten minutes before the accident.
The State's only evidence before the jury was the fact
that an automobil accident had occurred and that one
Flemming Christensen had died as a result of said accident.
Speculation and conjecture would be the only method by
which, under the evidence presented by the State, the
jury could have found the defendant had operated his
automobile in a reckless, negligent or careless manner; and
at the time of so doing was under the influence of intoxicat.. ·
ing liquor to such a degree as to render him incapable of
safely driving his automobile in the same manner that a
reasonable, prudent person with the full possession of his
faculties would have operated said automobile under
similar circumstances.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court erred in granting the State's motion
to strike out all of the evidence concerning Meniere's
Disease and further erred in adtnitting the blood test be..
cause of its lack of foundation and in submitting the mat.ter to the jury and therefore this Court should reverse the
Lower Court and remand the case for a new trial.
30

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

